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Guitron (Miguel) v. State, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 27 (May 21, 2015)1 
 




The Court determined that (1) the State presented sufficient evidence for a jury to 
convict Guitron of incest and sexual assault, (2) the district court did err by not allowing 
Guitron to introduce evidence of the victims sexual knowledge, but this error was harmless, 
(3) the district court did err refusing to give the jury Guitron’s requested inverse elements 
instruction, but this error was also harmless, and (4) Guitron could not show that the 




Guitron met the victim’s mother, Anita, in Las Vegas in 1997 or 1998 and the two 
dated for some time.  During that time, Anita became pregnant, but did not inform Guitron. 
When Anita was three or four months pregnant, she moved to Michigan without Guitron 
and the two did not stay in contact.  When the child was five years old, Anita applied for 
child support from Guitron, which was granted following a positive paternity test. 
In October of 2010, when the victim was eleven years old, Guitron called Anita.  The 
victim overheard the two talking on the phone and, realizing it was her father, asked to 
speak with him.  Anita described the victim as a “kid in a candy store” when she was talking 
to her father for the first time. 
After the phone call, Anita and the victim moved back to Las Vegas, where Anita 
resumed her relationship with Guitron and the victim enrolled in elementary school and an 
Individualized Learning Plan because she was a slow learner.  When the victim was twelve 
years old, Anita realized the victim was pregnant. DNA tests conclusively proved Guitron 
was the father of the victim’s baby.  Guitron also sent the victim letters, openly admitting he 
was the father. 
At trial, Guitron asserted he and the victim only engaged in sex on one occasion, 
while Guitron was intoxicated and partially unconscious.  Guitron argued the victim was 
sexually curious and wanted to have sex with him, and she was capable of understanding 
the consequences of her actions despite her age.  Guitron also argued that the State did not 
meet its burden of proof on the incest charges because the State did not present DNA 
evidence proving he was the victim’s father.  Guitron was conviction by a jury of incest, four 
counts of sexual assault with a minor under the age of 14, and two counts of lewdness with 




On appeal, Guitron contends (1) the State presented insufficient evidence for the 
jury to convict him of incest and sexual assault with a minor under the age of 14, (2) the 
district court erred by denying Guitron’s motion to admit evidence of the victim’s prior 
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sexual knowledge, (3) the district court erred by refusing to give Guitron’s proposed 
inverse instruction, and (4) the district court erred by denying Guitron’s Batson challenges. 
 
(1) The State presented insufficient evidence 
 
 With respect to the incest charge: NRS 201.180 defines incest as occurring when 
“[p]ersons being within the degree of consanguinity within which marriages are declared 
by law to be incestuous and void [either] intermarry with each other or . . . commit 
fornication or adultery with each other.”2  Although the State did not present DNA evidence 
proving Guitron was the victim’s father, both the victim and Anita testified that Guitron was 
the victim’s father.  Additionally, Guitron himself admitted numerous times he was the 
biological father of the victim.  The Court held, based on Guitron’s own statements, the jury 
could reasonably infer he was the biological father of the victim.  
 With respect to the sexual assault with a minor under the age of 14 charge: NRS 
200.366 defines sexual assault as occurring where a person “subjects another person to 
sexual penetration . . . against the will of the victim or under conditions in which the 
perpetrator knows or should know that the victim is mentally or physically incapable of 
resisting or understanding the nature of his or her conduct.”  Guitron argues that the victim 
consented to having sex and she knew or should have known the consequences of her 
actions, thus he should have been convicted of a lesser crime of statutory sexual seduction.  
At trial, the victim testified she was in love with Guitron and Guitron was in love with her.  
Guitron, through his counsel, asserted at trial that the victim initiated sex by climbing on 
top of him while he was intoxicated because she was curious about sex.   
The State presented evidence that the victim was young, a slow learner, and 
vulnerable.  Additionally, the State presented evidence that Guitron and the victim had sex 
on multiple occasions and the victim was initially reluctant.  The Court found that the State 
presented sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude the victim did not 
understand the consequences of her actions, she was incapable of giving her consent, and 
Guitron knew or should have known the victim was mentally or physically incapable of 
resisting his conduct when he engaged in sex with her. 
 
(2) Motion to admit evidence of a victim’s prior sexual knowledge 
 
 Guitron argued the district court erred by denying his motion to admit evidence of 
the victim’s prior knowledge of sexual conduct.  Specifically, Guitron wished to admit 
evidence that the victim had “vast sexual knowledge” from viewing internet pornography 
with her friends from middle school.  While Nevada’s rape shield law limits the degree to 
which a defendant may inquire into a victim’s past sexual history3, this limitation is 
tempered by the defendant’s fundamental rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.4  The Nevada Supreme Court in Summitt v. State held evidence that would 
ordinarily be bared by rape shield may be admissible if the defense uses such evidence not 
to advance a theory of the victim’s general lack of chastity, but to show knowledge or 
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motive.5  The district court must admit the evidence if used to show knowledge or motive 
and the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect of the evidence.  Here, the Court 
found that although the district court held a hearing on the motion in limine, it failed to 
explain its finding in light of the defense’s theory in the case. The district court simply 
found that the evidence was too prejudicial.  Because Guitron sought to admit the evidence 
of the victim watching internet pornography not to besmirch the victim character but 
rather to show knowledge of sexual conduct, the district court erred in denying the 
defendant’s motion to admit the evidence. 
 However, the Court found the error to be harmless.  Although the district court 
precluded Guitron from presenting evidence regarding the victim’s conduct of viewing 
internet pornography, the district court allowed Guitron to present other similar evidence 
and argue that the victim was knowledgeable of sex prior to having sexual intercourse with 
Guitron.  The Court found that, given the overwhelming evidence supporting the verdict 
and the fact that Guitron was not precluded from advancing his defense to the jury, the 
district court’s error did not contribute to the jury’s verdict and was therefore harmless.  
 
(3) Defendant’s requested inverse elements instruction 
 
 Guitron further claims the district court erred by rejecting his proposed inverse 
elements instruction as to the crime of sexual assault with a minor under the age of 14.  The 
district court rejected the proposed instruction because it would confuse the jurors and the 
inverse instruction added unnecessary extra explanation.  In Crawford v. State, the Nevada 
Supreme Court held that the district court may not refuse a defense instruction simply 
because it already was substantially covered by other instructions.6   
 The Court found that the negatively phrased elements instruction was not 
misleading to the jury under Crawford and the district court, therefore, abused its desertion 
in denying Guitron’s proposed instruction.  Nevertheless, the Court concluded this error 
was harmless under the circumstances, as the jury was accurately instructed regarding the 
elements of sexual assault and there was substantial evidence that supported the jury's 
verdict that Guitron committed sexual assault with a minor under the age of 14. 
 
(4) Batson challenges 
 
 Lastly, Guitron contends that under Batson v. Kentucky7, the State improperly used 
its peremptory challenges to remove non-white venire persons from the jury pool in 
violation of Guitron’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.  The three-pronged 
Batson test for determining whether illegal discrimination has occurred requires: (1) the 
opponent of the peremptory strike to show a prima facie case of discrimination, (2) the 
proponent of the strike to provide a race-neutral explanation, and (3) the district court to 
determine whether the proponent has “in fact demonstrated purposeful discrimination.”8 
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 Here, Guitron argues that the record indicates he initially objected to the State's 
preemptory strike of Prospective Juror 31, an Asian male, and the district court initially 
determined Guitron had failed to make a prima facia case as to that juror.  After the State 
exercised a preemptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror 52, an African-American 
female, Guitron renewed his objection, arguing the State had exercised more than half of its 
preemptory challenges on minorities.  The district court at that time turned to the State, 
seeking a race-neutral explanation.  The State indicated it had struck Juror 31 because he 
was a single father who automatically believed children.  As to Juror 52, the State indicated, 
among many other reasons, that it was currently prosecuting Juror 52 for a sex offense.  
The district court then turned to Guitron to show the State’s explanations were pretext.  To 
meet this burden, Guitron argued the State’s failure to strike similarly situated jurors 
evinced pretext.  The district court found the State’s reasons to be race-neutral and rejected 
the Batson challenge.  The Court found the State’s reasons to be clear, reasonably specific, 
facially legitimate, and did not communicate any inherent discriminatory intent and 




The Court found Guitron’s convictions of incest and sexual assault with a minor 
under the age of 14 to be supported by substantial evidence.  To the extent the district 
court erred in failing to allow evidence of the victim’s prior sexual knowledge and failing to 
give Guitron’s inverse elements instruction, those errors were harmless and did not 
warrant reversal.  Finally, Guitron failed to show the district court erred by denying his 
Batson challenges.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the jury’s verdict. 
